This paper makes some selective comparisons of the empirical evidence relating to financial discipline and soft budget constraints in the enterprise sector in China and the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (CEEFSU). The paper finds that: (1) in both CEEFSU countries and China, budgetary subsidies have fallen as prices have been liberalized, and the budgetary subsidies which remain are not clear evidence of soft budget constraints; (2) firms in both CEEFSU countries and China typically impose hard budget constraints on each other; levels of trade credit in China were roughly constant in 1994-96, implying inflows have approximately equalled outflows, i.e. interenterprise debts are being paid; the level of total trade credit observed in China, at about 20-25% of GDP, is similar to that observed not only in CEEFSU countries but also in developed Western economies; (3) in a comparison of bank financing of Chinese and Hungarian firms, Chinese banks were providing poorlyperforming firms with new financing, whereas in Hungary, banks were reducing their exposure to bad firms; and (4) tax arrears in CEEFSU economies have emerged as a major source of soft budget constraints in recent years, but enterprise-level data for China show that as of the early 1990s, tax arrears were not an important source of financing for loss-making Chinese firms.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to make some selective comparisons of the empirical evidence relating to financial discipline and soft budget constraints 1 in the enterprise sector in China and the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (CEEFSU). We divide the evidence into four categories: budgetary subsidies, trade credit, the banking system, and tax arrears. The reasons for this division include the following.
First, government budgetary subsidies to enterprises are the most frequently cited as evidence of traditional soft budget constraints in centrally-planned economies, and are therefore a natural starting point for our analysis. We find that in both CEEFSU countries and China, budgetary subsidies have fallen as prices have been liberalized, and the budgetary subsidies which remain are not clear evidence of soft budget constraints. Secondly, the appearance of overdue trade credit or "inter-enterprise arrears" is a relatively new phenomenon in transition economies and has often been considered as a particularly important and typical source of soft budget constraints. Our analysis suggests, however, this is usually not the case: firms in both CEEFSU countries and China typically impose hard budget constraints on each other. We estimate that the level of total trade credit in China was roughly constant in 1994-96 at about 20-25% of GDP. A constant stock implies inflows approximately equal outflows, i.e. interenterprise debts are being paid. Moreover, the volume of trade credit in China is comparable to that observed not only in CEEFSU countries but also in developed Western economies.
We suggest that when overdue trade credit does appear to be a cause of soft budget constraints, it is because it leads the government, in response to lobbying by firms, to bail them out. Thirdly, we investigate whether soft budget constraints in the enterprise sector occur via the banking sector by using enterprise-level data from China and Hungary to see if poorly-performing firms were receiving positive net bank financing. We find that in China, banks were providing poorly-performing firms with new financing, whereas in Hungary, banks were reducing their exposure to bad firms. Finally, tax arrears in CEEFSU economies have emerged as a major source of soft budget constraints in recent years. We consider the evidence and explanations for this, and use enterprise-level data for China to show that as of the early 1990s, tax arrears were not an important source of financing for loss-making Chinese firms.
Budgetary subsidies
Budgetary subsidies in most CEEFSU transition economies were cut very substantially early in the transition, and have stayed much lower than pre-transition. Table 1 shows that budgetary subsidies in both rapid and slow reforming transition economies in CEEFSU fell from about 10-25 per cent of GDP prior to the start of transition to about 3-5 per cent of GDP by the early 1990s. In the case of China, budgetary subsidies have also declined in recent years, from 8.6 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 1.2 per cent in 1995 (Table 1 ). Why such a big fall?
The explanation for the declining budgetary subsidies in CEEFSU countries and China is primarily price liberalization. Under central planning, a state-owned enterprise was a passive production unit. The state set all the prices and quantities of its inputs and outputs. Budgetary subsidies to enterprises were used as a device to adjust for the effects of comprehensive price and quantity control. When the controlled price of a good was low relative to the costs of its inputs, a product-specific subsidy was used to compensate. Price liberalization means that firms are now free to decide the level of their output and prices, and in particular they are free to raise prices to cover costs. Firms' losses resulting from price controls were eliminated and hence the corresponding product-specific budgetary subsidies were no longer needed.
Are the observed remaining budgetary subsidies obviously evidence of soft budget constraints? The answer to this question depends on how and why these subsidies are used. If they are used to bail out inefficient and otherwise loss-making enterprises, then there is clearly evidence of soft budget constraints. If they are used to subsidize firms whose losses derive simply from government price controls and which are actually operating efficiently, then this is not a case of soft budget constraints. Unfortunately, we can not readily separate empirically these two cases. There is evidence, however, suggesting that the remaining subsidies in both CEEFSU countries and China are closely related to their remaining price control practices. Table 1 . Budgetary subsidies as per cent of GDP in CEEFSU countries and China SOE losses might still be price-related, and therefore the existing loss subsidies could be well due to existing price controls; indeed several studies suggest that this is the case. and Broadman (1994) show that the main loss-making SOEs are concentrated in pricecontrolled sectors, e.g. grain, coal, oil, electricity, and wool sectors, though they also existed in other sectors, e.g. textiles, machinery, and food processing. Nevertheless the point here is that the remaining budgetary subsidies in China are at least in part price-related and hence are not clear evidence of continuing soft budget constraints.
Another significant source of SOE losses in China is the social and public obligations imposed on them by the government. Chinese SOEs are burdened with the support of an excessive workforce by keeping redundant workers on their payroll and the provision of public services such as housing, health care, pensions, and childcare for their employees. Even if a firm is profitable in terms of its operating costs and revenues, its social and public obligations may still cause it to be in the red. The remaining subsidies may therefore be justified if they are also used to compensate for SOEs' losses due to their social safety net obligations. The
World Bank (1997) reports that the most recent practice in China is to provide direct fiscal subsidies to SOEs only for "policy losses" (e.g., in the coal sector where prices are controlled below costs) and for "operational losses" when there are extenuating circumstances and only on a temporary basis (e.g., when a loss-making SOE cannot meet its employee medical expenses). These practices further suggest that budgetary subsidies do not seem to be an obvious source of soft budget constraints.
It therefore appears that the situation we observe in China is similar to that in the leading CEEFSU countries: the bulk of remaining budgetary subsidies are used to compensate for the remaining price controls which are typically concentrated in a relatively small number of sectors and are not clearly related to soft budget constraints. It is also interesting to note that the current level of budgetary subsidies as a percentage of GDP in leading CEEFSU transition countries and in China is also comparable to that observed in developed Western economies-typically on the order of a few per cent of GDP.
Trade credit and "inter-enterprise arrears"
Trade credit refers to the credit extended by one firm to another as part of sales and purchases of inputs and outputs. It arises from the period between the time goods are delivered and services performed and the time payment for these goods and services takes place. A time period is normally specified (e.g., 4 weeks), by the end of which the customer is supposed to pay. If a payment is delayed beyond this deadline, the trade credit is "in arrears".
Under strict central planning, levels of total trade credit were low, reflecting only the time taken by the banking system to clear payments between firms, and overdue trade credit-"inter-enterprise arrears"-in principle did not exist at all. In transition economies, firms become responsible for paying for goods and services themselves. The result has been the emergence of large volumes of total trade credit and overdue trade credit.
It has been observed that stocks of total trade credit, and of overdue trade credit, have increased very substantially in CEEFSU countries. This is sometimes put forward as evidence of soft budget constraints, financial indiscipline, etc. We argue instead that the presence of inter-enterprise arrears in CEEFSU countries is not necessarily evidence of soft budget constraints, and when it is, it is the government that has been "soft", and not firms.
The most straightforward way to establish that the presence of trade credit and interenterprise arrears in CEEFSU countries is not necessarily evidence of financial indiscipline is to compare the levels of trade credit to those observed in developed Western countries, and to observe the levels of trade credit over time. Consequently, the stock of overdue trade credit ("inter-enterprise arrears") in CEEFSU countries, amounting to around 7 to 18 per cent of GDP, is also comparable to that observed in Western economies. Source: Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) .
"Inter-enterprise arrears" have not been a problem in the CEEFSU transition countries because firms have learned to apply hard budget constraints towards each other. In particular, they adopt simple credit control mechanisms such as requiring partial or full payment in advance or on delivery, stopping shipments of supplies to customers who are too far behind in their payments, and so forth. 4 Both firms in CEEFSU countries and firms in Western economies tolerate late payment by customers because if they insisted on strict payment discipline they would lose their customers to competitors that offered more relaxed payment terms. It is interesting to note that firms in CEEFSU countries were able to impose financial discipline on each other in spite of the absence of a well-functioning system of bankruptcy law and actual low numbers of bankruptcies-the simple credit control mechanisms identified above appear to have been sufficient.
It is well known, however, that inter-enterprise arrears crises in CEEFSU countries have in some cases caused governments to inject funds in an attempt to clear these arrears. This brings us to our second point, namely that government may be "soft" in the presence of interenterprise arrears. 5 If the government is soft, firms may collude in non-payment to each other, anticipating that the state will bail them out. 6 In all cases of government clearance of interenterprise arrears in CEEFSU countries, the arrears reappeared-not surprisingly, given that late payment is a normal feature of market economies. Experience from CEEFSU countries suggests the policy which is more likely to be successful is for the government to do nothing; if firms are left alone, the inter-enterprise arrears problem disappears because firms are not soft and apply hard budget constraints towards each other.
The case of China is very similar to that of the CEEFSU transition economies. The level (stock) of trade credit in China has grown considerably over recent years, and is now comparable to levels observed in both the CEEFSU countries and developed Western economies. The stock of trade credit has, moreover, stabilized in recent years-inflows now more or less match outflows. Furthermore, in common with some of the slower-reforming CEEFSU countries, China has attempted several times-like the CEEFSU countries, without success-to clear the inter-enterprise arrears. 
Notes: a: Data on receivables cover approximately 370,000 industrial enterprises (including non-SOEs).
Source: Fan (1996) , Table 2, and Chinese Statistical Bulletin, 1996. b: Estimates cover non-agricultural non-financial enterprises (industry, construction, trade, transportation, communications Table 3 shows that in 1985, the level of trade credit in China was very low by Western standards, and comparable to that observed in a planned economy-the average payment period was about 2 weeks, the same as that in Russia prior to the start of transition (see Table   2 ). The level of trade credit began to increase in the late 1980s, and we estimate that by 1994 the volume of total trade credit in the non-agricultural economy was the equivalent of 22 per cent of GDP, corresponding to an average payment period of two months. Since 1994, the level of trade credit has remained at these levels. A comparison with Table 2 shows that the current levels of trade credit in China are comparable to those observed in both CEEFSU and developed market economies. Unfortunately information on overdue trade credit in China is not available, and therefore a comparison can not be made here.
It has often been argued that in China, SOEs face soft budget constraints whereas collectively-owned enterprises (e.g. township and village enterprises, TVEs) and private firms face hard budget constraints. Are SOEs capable of imposing hard budget constraints on their customers? Table 4 shows that in 1996, trade credit extended to customers by Chinese SOEs was somewhat larger than that extended by TVEs in particular (average payment period of 2.3 months for SOEs vs. 1.3 for TVEs), but about the same as that extended by private firms and non-TVE collective firms. We saw, moreover, from Table 3 that the volume of trade credit extended by SOEs was the equivalent of about 2 months of sales over the period 1995-96, again implying that on average SOEs have been collecting payment for their sales; inflows have been roughly equal to outflows as old goods are paid for and new goods are shipped. It is often observed that currently many SOEs are in financial difficulties, and this is evident from the low profitability rates and the large proportion of loss-making firms (Table 4) , but an inability to impose hard budget constraints on their customers does not appear to be a major source of financial problems of SOEs.
In sum, after 11 years of economic reform, 1985-1996-132 months of reform-total trade credit outstanding amounts to perhaps two months of transactions overall. It therefore seems that, as in the CEEFSU countries, almost everything has been paid for in China as well.
However, as discussed above, trade credit has been an indirect source of soft budget constraints in China. Between 1990 and 1992 the People's Bank of China (the central bank)
attempted to clear inter-enterprise debts by injecting three tranches of credit amounting to a total of 46.6 billion yuan (the equivalent of 2% of GDP); in addition, 3.9 billion yuan of government spending was used for the same purpose (Fan, 1996) . Although this programme resulted in the clearing of a substantial volume of trade credit, amounting to 201.8 billion yuan or 10% of GDP, it was clearly ineffective in stopping the increase in trade credit in China, as we saw above (Table 3) . The Chinese experience is thus similar in a number of respects to what has been observed in some CEEFSU countries: the state appears to be soft, and arrears reappear following the attempted clearing operations. The CEEFSU experience suggests that Chinese policy-makers should consider the alternative policy of letting market forces take care of the inter-enterprise arrears "problem"-if Chinese firms are left alone, the level of trade credit should stabilize.
Indeed, Fan (1996) reports that since 1993 the policy of the PBC has been that loans to clear inter-enterprise arrears should not be granted in any circumstances, and as levels of trade credit in 1994-96 stabilized at levels comparable to those observed in developed Western economies (as well as in CEEFSU economies), it appears this policy has been successful.
We note here that the relative weakness of the bankruptcy law framework in China is sometimes cited as an obstacle to solving the arrears problem, but the experience of the CEEFSU countries suggests this is not a major obstacle-the CEEFSU countries also had weak bankruptcy law frameworks, and despite this, firms were able to impose hard budget constraints on each other, and volumes of trade credit stabilized at levels observed in Western economies. The fact that the level of trade credit in China in 1994-96 also stabilized at these levels suggests that weak bankruptcy laws have not been an obstacle there either.
Bad debts and banks
The bank-enterprise relationship in transition economies is very complex, with a considerable degree of variation between countries. Roughly speaking, the evidence suggests that banks in the leading transition countries are fairly hard and are not a source of soft budget constraints; the debate there is how long it has taken for this behaviour to emerge. In the slower reformers, governments have used the banking sector to channel soft credits to loss-making or politically influential firms; this is a case of the soft budget constraint, though it is the government rather than the banks which is the source of the softness. In this section we first use the experience of CEEFSU countries to illustrate some of the measurement problems involved in assessing whether the banking sector contributes to the soft budget constraints of firms. We will concentrate in particular on the large and growing volume of "bad debts" in the enterprise sector and try to assess whether they constitute evidence of soft budget constraints.
We then turn to evidence on bank behaviour in China. In the case of CEEFSU, most economies started transition with a deep recession-on the order of 20-50% fall in GDP. We would expect many firms to experience financial difficulties, and in particular to be unable to service the bank debts they had at the start of the period, in any economy with output declines of such depth. We should therefore expect large volumes of non-performing bank loans to emerge eventually, when the banks finally recognize and formally qualify these bad debts.
In addition to these "inherited bad debt stock" problems, we would also expect to observe some initial bad debt "flow" problems to firms. At the start of transition, many firms in CEEFSU countries continued to borrow even though credits were expensive because of their expectation that the recession would only be temporary and their investment would be paid off once the recession were over. At the same time, banks in early stages of transition lacked the necessary experience and expertise to evaluate their true portfolio positions. Loans made even with the best of intentions in early transition may also turn bad due to similar factors such as lack of experience and expertise.
Hungary provides a nice example of these measurement problems. In 1992-93, the volume of bad loans grew tremendously, by a factor of about 5 in real terms, the increase being equivalent to about 10% of GDP. Some observers concluded from this that the Hungarian banking sector was very soft and that firms had soft budget constraints. Bonin and Schaffer (1995) and Schaffer (1998) , however, use enterprise data to argue that Hungarian banks were not injecting new funds into unprofitable firms; on the contrary, they were apparently trying to reduce their exposure to them. Net bank financing-the increase in bank debt net of interest payments-of highly unprofitable firms was negative, not positive. That is, the flow of cash was not from the banks to the problem firms, it was from the problem firms to the banks. This shows that Hungarian banks were not soft in 1992-93-at the same time they were trying to reduce their exposure to their unprofitable borrowers, they were admitting publicly the bad debts problem and were qualifying large portions of their portfolios as bad.
We now turn to the bad debt problem in China. The scale of the bad debt problem can be measured in two ways: classified loans as a percentage of all loans, and the volume of classified loans in relation to the scale of economic activity (e.g., GDP). Table 5 Woo (1996) and here applied to PBC figures for total credit stock; for China (1996) , figure for percentage of bad loans in the 4 largest Chinese commercial banks cited in The Economist, 13.09.97 , and here applied to PBC figures for total credit stock.
The explanation for this can be seen from Tables 6 and 7 . The scale of total credit in China, 88% of GDP in 1995, is large compared to that observed in most CEEFSU countries (Table   6 ). Most of this bank credit consists of lending to firms, and hence we observe that the Chinese firms are heavily indebted compared to their CEEFSU counterparts- Table 7 shows that the debt/asset ratio at book value in Chinese enterprises in 1994 was 65%, compared to 30-45% observed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. It is worth noting that the debt/asset ratios observed in developed Western countries are in the range of 55-75% (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) , i.e. it is the CEEFSU level which is low by international standards and not the Chinese level which is high. It should also be noted that debt/asset ratios in the CEEFSU countries were also low prior to the start of transition, meaning that CEEFSU firms inherited low debt levels from the socialist period. 
Czech Republic 64
Hungary 23
Poland 20
Romania 23
Russia 12

Slovakia 59
Slovenia 28
China 88
Source: OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation (1997 ), p.92, IMF, International Financial Statistics, December 1997 , China Statistical Bulletin 1996 , and own calculations. Cornelli et al. (1996); China: Chinese Statistical Yearbook, 1995, using tables 12 -9, 12 -11 & 12 -12. The explanation for the high debt/asset ratio in Chinese enterprises compared to CEEFSU While movement towards a market economy has made great progress in China, the financial sector is an exception. The banking sector remains dominated by a few very large stateowned banks. Central planning of goods was progressively abandoned during the reform period, but state direction of bank lending for policy or political purposes continued. In these respects the functioning of China's banking sector resembles those of some of the less-rapidly reforming CEEFSU transition countries, and as in these countries, the effect has been to contribute to the growth of bad debts in the banking sector.
The general view in the literature on the Chinese banking system (e.g. World Bank, 1995 , Bouin 1996 , Woo 1996 ) is roughly as follows. During the reform period, decentralization granted local governments with a greater control over state banks' local branches. The greater autonomy of local governments combined with quantitative credit control has given room to political pressure, corruption, and collusive behaviour between banks, governments and enterprises. Local governments pressure local banks to lend to their controlled SOEs and support local projects to promote local development. The expected economic value of these projects alone presumably would not justify this lending, and hence the recipients of these loans will often not be in a position to service or repay them. Furthermore, when SOEs run into financial difficulties, whether because they are overindebted or because of other reasons, local governments and enterprises lobby the authorities to direct banks to rescue firms by injecting new loans-a case of the soft budget constraint. To the extent that these loans will not actually be repaid, they can be seen as providing in effect a flow of quasi-fiscal subsidies to enterprises; an additional subsidy element derives from charging low (or negative, in real terms) interest rates.
In this analysis of the Chinese banking sector, the bad debt problem does not resemble that in the faster CEEFSU reformers (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), which can be characterized as a bad debt stock problem but no major flow problem. In these countries, a large portion of the bad debt stock problem appears to have either been inherited from the pre-transition period in the sense that the recession which accompanied the start of transition meant many firms could not service their debts, or been the result of imprudent lending early in the transition; the flow problem appears small in the sense that cautious lending policies by most state-owned or privatized banks emerged within a couple of years of the start of transition. The Chinese situation is instead more akin to the situation in the slower reformers in the first several years or so of transition (e.g. Bulgaria and many of the countries of former Soviet Union), where state direction of credits for political purposes was common; such loans were often made at very negative real interest rates and the principal rapidly deflated, rolled over, or forgiven, and the loans were often directed to distressed and/or politically influential firms.
We now investigate directly this characterization of the Chinese banking sector with the help of a dataset of 500-odd Chinese state-owned industrial enterprises for 1991. 8 We apply the method of Bonin and Schaffer (1995) and look at the relationship between net bank financing and firm performance. If net bank financing of poorly performing firms is positive we have evidence of soft budget constraints. That is, if poorly performing firms see an increase in nominal lending greater than the interest they are paying to the banks, the banks are not merely rolling over debts, they are "throwing good money after bad".
Net bank financing of firm i is defined as:
We measure performance in two ways, using lagged profitability and lagged output growth.
Profitability is defined as: Endtotal assets (in % 1991 Endtotal assets (in % 1990 Endtotal assets (in % 1991 bank debt − − int cos ) Pr ) ofitability = gross profit profit taxes and other fees Endtotal assets (in % 1990 Endtotal assets (in % 1991 Profitability is defined using the firms' 1990 results for the reason that these should have been known to banks when they were making their 1991 loans. There are problems with profit as a measure of performance, however, since in this case some of the losses experienced by firms may have been due to price controls, as discussed earlier in this paper. 9 For this reason, we us an additional performance measure, lagged real output growth. This is defined as:
The simplest way to present the data is using a scatterplot, with net bank financing on the vertical axis and either profitability or output growth on the horizontal axis. It is also helpful to be able to distinguish between large and small borrowers, and so we weight each point A comparison with Hungarian firms in 1993 makes an interesting contrast. 10 We use a comprehensive dataset of Hungarian firms as collected by the central statistical office. As before, in order to make the scatterplot readable, only firms with bank debts in excess of US $1 million are plotted. Figure 3 shows the relationship between net bank financing in Hungary profitable and/or growing firms were willing to borrow, and there were many growing firms to whom banks could lend.
Tax arrears 11
The problem of tax arrears is quite different from the problem of tax evasion. The answer to tax evasion is improving detection of tax liabilities; the answer to tax arrears is improving collection of tax liabilities that have been accrued, are known both to the tax authority and to the firm, but the firm has not paid.
In the CEEFSU transition countries, virtually all tax arrears are owed by firms rather than individuals. Schaffer (1995 Schaffer ( , 1996 estimates that the aggregate real flow of tax arrears in CEEFSU transition economies is on the order of 1-3% of GDP per annum. This is much higher than what we observe in Western countries. The comparable figure in Western economies is the volume of taxes written off as uncollectable, and is a fraction of a percent of GDP per annum. For example, in New Zealand, tax arrears written off as uncollectable in 1994 amounted to 0.3% of GDP.
Tax arrears arise because the state does not pursue firms into liquidation in pursuit of its tax claim and instead tolerates non-payment of taxes, and inflows to the stock of tax arrears continue. The available empirical evidence suggests a large portion of the tax arrears problem is located in financially distressed firms. Because these firms are in serious difficulties, these tax arrears are unlikely ever to be collected. Government toleration of tax arrears means in effect that these firms are being subsidized.
The implication of this is that tax arrears should be highly concentrated in distressed firms, and this is indeed what is found. Surveys and Schaffer (1996) . Schaffer (1995) offers the following explanation of why the tax authorities tolerate the accumulation of tax arrears in distressed firms. Because the distressed firm is typically paying its workers and suppliers out of sales revenue, the firm is generating positive value added. If the tax authority allows the firm to continue to operate it may be able to pressure the firm to pay part of its taxes. If the tax authority takes legal action to have the firm liquidated, the liquidation value will be low and little of the overdue tax liabilities will be paid, the value added currently being generated by the firm will be lost, it will take time for the capital and labour freed up to find alternative uses, and in the meantime the resulting unemployment will be politically costly.
The case of tax arrears in China is, to our knowledge, unstudied. The academic, policy, and journalistic literature focuses on subsidies, bad debts, and trade credit arrears, and tax arrears appear to go unmentioned. This would suggest that, in contrast to the case of the CEEFSU transition countries, tax arrears are not currently a problem in China. The only evidence we have available to us on this come from the survey of Chinese SOEs analysed above in Section 4.
We divided the sample of Chinese SOEs in 1991 into 343 profit-makers and 175 loss-makers, and looked at real increases in tax liabilities in the two categories of firms separately. The median real increase in total tax liabilities between end-1990 and end-1991, measured as a percentage of end-year assets, 13 was in fact very small in both categories: the equivalent of 0.1% of assets in the group of loss-makers, and no real increase at all in the group of profitmakers. This is in sharp contrast to the findings reported by Schaffer (1998) This evidence supports the view that indeed tax arrears have not so far presented a financial discipline problem in China. Nevertheless, more research is clearly needed, and the CEEFSU experience suggests that if budget constraints become very hard in China, a tax arrears problem may emerge.
Summary
In parallel with price liberalization, budgetary subsidies fallen substantially both in China and in CEEFSU transition countries, and are typically associated with remaining price controls.
For this reason, it is difficult to demonstrate that remaining subsidies are clear evidence of soft budget constraints.
The scale of trade credit and "inter-enterprise arrears" in the CEEFSU transition economies, and in China, are roughly comparable to those observed in developed Western economies.
More importantly, firms in the CEEFSU countries and in China typically impose financial discipline towards each other. There are, however, some signs that in China trade credit is linked to soft budget constraints, via government policy, which has been soft towards firms.
In China, as in some of the slower reforming CEEFSU countries, the government has attempted to clear inter-enterprise arrears by injecting credit. As in the CEEFSU cases, the arrears reappeared. This is only natural because trade credit is a normal feature of market economies. We have argued that the best policy in China, as in the CEEFSU countries, is for the government not to attempt to clear such arrears, since this amounts to a bailout of the enterprise sector and creates moral hazard problems as firms, anticipating the bailout, cease paying each other.
We have suggested that, when looking at the bank-enterprise relationship in transition economies, the usual data available on non-performing debt needs to be interpreted carefully, and can usefully be supplemented by using firm-level data to examine the relationship between enterprise performance and net bank financing. We argued that banks in leading CEEFSU transition countries are usually hard, and, using Hungary as an example, showed that in 1993 poorly-performing Hungarian firms did not receive positive net bank financing.
In contrast, banks in China seem to be softer: it is hard for banks to resist political pressure from local governments and enterprises to lend money to financially distressed firms. This was reflected in the enterprise-level data we analysed: in 1991, poorly-performing Chinese firms received positive net bank financing. In other words, although both Hungary and China had bad debt stock problems, only China had a bad debt flow problem. Chinese, but not Hungarian, firms had soft budget constraints.
Tax arrears appear to be an important source of soft budget constraints in CEEFSU countries. The little evidence we have available on China suggests that the situation in China is different and that tax arrears are not, or not yet, a major policy problem in China. More research is called for here.
Endnotes
1. "Soft budget constraint" in this paper is defined as a form of "financial indiscipline" in the enterprise sector. Following Konai (e.g. his 1986 paper in Kyklos), the state is paternalistic, hence "weak" or "soft", and poorly performing firms will be rescued by
